Ludwig Gomez Hernandez v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 17 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LUDWIG ANTONIO GOMEZ No. 20-71417 HERNANDEZ, AKA Ludwin Antonio Hernandez, Agency No. A042-245-175 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted June 10, 2021** Pasadena, California Before: MURGUIA and BADE, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,*** District Judge. Ludwin Gomez Hernandez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion for a fourth continuance.1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recite them here. We review the agency’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009). We deny the petition for review. 1. The government argues that we lack jurisdiction over Gomez’s petition because the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020), effectively overruled longstanding Ninth Circuit precedent explaining that the jurisdictional bar of § 1252(a)(2)(C) “does not sweep in all petitions for review filed by petitioners with a qualifying conviction in their past,” Garcia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations, alterations, and citation omitted), and holding that § 1252(a)(2)(C) does not deprive us of jurisdiction over “a procedural motion that rests on a ground independent of the conviction that triggers the bar,” id. at 881. But in Nasrallah the Court answered only the “narrow question” of whether an appellate court may review a noncitizen’s factual challenges to an agency’s order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and it did not consider or decide how §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D) apply to motions for continuances. See 140 S. Ct. at 1688. Because Nasrallah addresses a different 1 The record offers various versions of Gomez’s first name, including “Ludwig,” “Ludwing,” and “Ludwin.” 2 situation than the one at issue here, it is not “clearly irreconcilable” with Garcia and we maintain jurisdiction over the petition. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s authority must “undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable”). 2. Gomez argues that the agency abused its discretion in denying his motion for a fourth continuance. An IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29; see Matter of L-A-B-R, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 407 (A.G. …

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