NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 20 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADIEL ALFREDO RIVERA-TRINIDAD, No. 20-71463 Petitioner, Agency No. A209-388-572 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted June 10, 2021** Seattle, Washington Before: GILMAN,*** GOULD, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Adiel Alfredo Rivera-Trinidad, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States unlawfully in October 2016. The Department of Homeland * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against him by filing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) with the immigration court in November 2016. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a). The DHS charged Rivera-Trinidad with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Rivera-Trinidad appeared before an immigration judge (“IJ”) and sought relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. In March 2018, the IJ issued an oral decision finding Rivera-Trinidad removable as charged and denying the applications for relief. Rivera-Trinidad appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the BIA dismissed Rivera-Trinidad’s appeal. Rivera-Trinidad petitioned for review. Where the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning and supplements that reasoning with its own analysis, we review both decisions. Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). The scope of this Court’s review over the BIA’s denial of asylum is extremely narrow and “highly deferential.” Jie Shi Liu v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 2018). Findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020). To reverse the administrative factual determinations under the substantial-evidence standard, the Court “must find that the evidence not only supports [a contrary] 2 conclusion, but compels it . . . .” I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1, 483–84 (2012) (emphasis in original). For the following reasons, Rivera-Trinidad’s petition is dismissed in part and denied in part. First, Rivera-Trinidad did not exhaust his claim that he held “a political opinion that would lead to his harm,” so we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to review it. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence supports the denial of Rivera-Trinidad’s remaining exhausted claims for asylum and withholding of removal. While Rivera-Trinidad claimed an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution on account of his membership in a particular social group of “close family members of a police officer killed by gang members in El Salvador, who oppose criminal gangs,” that fear was undermined by the fact …
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