NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 16 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DONG JIM HUANG, AKA Dong Jin No. 20-71879 Huang, Agency No. A209-153-121 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 12, 2021** Seattle, Washington Before: BEA, BRESS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. Dong Huang petitions for review of the agency’s determinations that she: (1) lacked credibility, (2) failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of persecution, and (3) waived her claim for relief under the Convention Against * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) over Petitioner’s first two claims, but we lack jurisdiction over her CAT claim. We deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part.1 First, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 2020). Petitioner repeatedly omitted a key incident of alleged harm—the forced insertion of an intrauterine device (IUD) when she was in China—in her removal proceedings. Cf. Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n adverse credibility determination may be supported by omissions that are not ‘details,’ but new allegations that tell a much different—and more compelling—story of persecution than the initial application.” (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). And she initially explicitly denied any harm from Chinese family planning officials. Cf. Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1270 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If the person cannot tell substantially the same story twice in substantially the same way, that suggests a likelihood that the story is false.”). Petitioner also provided contradictory testimony regarding how frequently she attended church, which, as the only evidence of her religious practice in China, directly undermined the heart of her religious persecution claim. Cf. Shrestha v. 1 The parties are familiar with the facts, so we discuss them here only as necessary. 2 Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although inconsistencies no longer need to go to the heart of the petitioner’s claim, when an inconsistency is at the heart of the claim it doubtless is of great weight.”). Her attempts to justify her omissions and inconsistencies were unpersuasive and at times contradictory—for example, she claimed that her contradictory testimony regarding her church attendance was she because she thought the prior questions were about other religions, even though her IJ hearing only focused on Christianity. Petitioner also failed sufficiently to corroborate her testimony with readily accessible evidence, further supporting the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1008–09 (9th Cir. 2017). Given the totality of circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s incomplete, contradictory, and unpersuasive representations, the record does not compel …
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