Spicerv. McDonald


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS No. 18-4489 LUTHER D. SPICER, JR., APPELLANT, V. DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE. On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Argued September 29, 2020 Decided September 14, 2021) Christopher Glenn Murray, with whom John D. Niles and Barton F. Stichman were on the brief, all of Washington, D.C., for the appellant. Bobbiretta E. Jordan, with whom William A. Hudson, Jr., Acting General Counsel; Mary Ann Flynn, Chief Counsel; Kenneth A. Walsh, Deputy Chief Counsel; and Jessica K. Grunberg, Senior Appellate Attorney, were on the brief, all of Washington, D.C., for the appellee. Before PIETSCH, ALLEN, and TOTH, Judges. TOTH, Judge, filed the opinion of the Court. ALLEN, Judge, filed a dissenting opinion. TOTH, Judge: Veteran Luther D. Spicer, Jr., served in the U.S. Air Force from May 1958 to September 1959. The Board denied him compensation for a bilateral leg disability, primarily characterized by weakness and instability from arthritis in both knees. Before the Agency, Mr. Spicer sought compensation for this disability on the theory that it was secondary to his service- connected leukemia. But he did not contend that leukemia caused his bilateral leg disability; nor did he argue that leukemia aggravated it—that is, made it worse. Instead, he maintains that he should be compensated for the current level of functional impairment because treatment he received for his leukemia prevented him from undergoing surgery that could potentially alleviate his bilateral leg disability. Relying on VA's secondary-service-connection regulation, the Board determined that the law didn't authorize disability compensation on such a theory. On appeal, Mr. Spicer argues that, notwithstanding any regulation, the statute that establishes basic entitlement to VA disability compensation authorizes service connection in these circumstances. Because we conclude that the statutory language at issue does not direct VA to provide compensation absent causation or aggravation, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND A. This case turns on some fundamental principles governing the award of VA disability compensation. "Basic entitlement" is spelled out in 38 U.S.C. § 1110, which presently provides: For disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military, naval, air, or space service, during a period of war, the United States will pay to any veteran thus disabled and who was discharged or released under conditions other than dishonorable from the period of service in which said injury or disease was incurred, or preexisting injury or disease was aggravated, compensation as provided in this subchapter, but no compensation shall be paid if the disability is a result of the veteran's own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol or drugs. 38 U.S.C. § 1110.1 Congress further specified that a "preexisting injury or disease will be considered to have been aggravated by active military, naval, air, or space service, where there is an increase in disability during such service, unless there is a specific finding that the …

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