20-2317 Arcentales Santos v. Garland BIA Lurye, IJ A208 000 969 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 27th day of October, two thousand twenty-one. PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ CARMEN LUCRECIA ARCENTALES SANTOS, Petitioner, v. 20-2317 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: PAUL O’DWYER, Law Office of Paul O’Dwyer P.C., New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: DAVID J. SCHOR, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation (Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation Counsel, on the brief) for Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Carmen Lucrecia Arcentales Santos, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of a decision of the BIA that affirmed an order of removal entered by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). In re Carmen Lucrecia Arcentales Santos, No. A 208 000 969 (B.I.A. June 22, 2020), aff’g No. A 208 000 969 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 26, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. When the BIA’s “opinion closely tracks the IJ’s reasoning” without “expressly ‘adopt[ing]’” it, we typically consider both opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). To the extent that the BIA’s decision differs from that of the IJ, explicitly or 2 impliedly, we review the BIA’s decision as the final decision of the agency. See Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659 (2007) (explaining that “[t]he federal courts ordinarily are empowered to review only an agency’s final action”); Yang v. DOJ, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005) (reviewing “the judgment of the IJ as modified by the BIA’s decision” where the BIA rejected one ground of the IJ’s decision). “We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo.” Ahmed v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 237, 240 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In her petition, Arcentales Santos argues that the agency erred in ordering her removal under 8 U.S.C. § …
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