NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 17 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT HECTOR HUGO BRAVO-COCCO, AKA No. 14-72989 Hector Albertene, AKA Hector Bravo, AKA Hector H. Bravo, AKA Hector Hugo Bravo, Agency No. A200-080-750 AKA Hector Bravo Cocco, AKA Hector Hugo Bravo Cocco, AKA Hector Cocco, AKA Hector Hugo Cocco, AKA Hector Hugo Coco, AKA Hugo Sass, AKA Hugo L. MEMORANDUM* Sass, AKA Flaco Three, Petitioner, v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted January 9, 2018 Pasadena, California Before: M. SMITH and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** District Judge. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Hector Hugo Bravo-Cocco, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal. The BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying Bravo- Cocco’s application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review questions of law de novo. See Corona-Mendez v. Holder, 593 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2010). We review administrative findings of fact for substantial evidence. See Urzua Covarrubias v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2007). We DENY the petition. To be eligible for cancellation of removal, an alien must prove, among other things, that he has been “a person of good moral character” during the ten years preceding his application for relief. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i), 1229b(b)(1). The IJ denied Bravo-Cocco’s application, finding that Bravo-Cocco could not be “regarded as a person of good moral character” because in the preceding ten years he had been “confine[d] to a penal institution for an aggregate period of 180 days or more.” The BIA agreed. 1. The Government initially argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider Bravo-Cocco’s challenges to the agency’s decision because he failed to raise before the BIA the arguments he raises here. We disagree. We have “jurisdiction to review a final order of removal and the issues raised in a petition for review only if ‘the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of 2 right.’” Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). “[W]e do not employ the exhaustion doctrine in a formalistic manner, but rather inquire into whether the issue was before the BIA such that it had an opportunity to correct its error. The exhaustion doctrine requires that the petitioner ‘put the BIA on notice’ as to the specific issues . . . .” Id. (quoting Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2004)). Moreover, Bravo-Cocco was proceeding pro se below, and papers of aliens proceeding pro ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals