19-1706 Ali Shah v. Garland BIA Tsankov, IJ A029 947 474 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of January, two thousand twenty-two. PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, SUSAN L. CARNEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ SYED AMIR ALI SHAH, AKA GHULAM ABBAS, Petitioner, v. 19-1706 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Naresh M. Gehi, Gehi and Associates, Forest Hills, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Yanal H. Yousef, Trial Attorney, for Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, and Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Syed Amir Ali Shah, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review of a May 10, 2019, decision of the BIA affirming a November 28, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ,” and collectively with the BIA, the “Agency”) denying Ali Shah’s application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Syed Amir Ali Shah, No. A029 947 474 (B.I.A. May 10, 2019), aff’g No. A029 947 474 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 28, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions. See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). “We review the [A]gency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility findings, under the substantial evidence standard, which 2 requires that they be supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record when considered as a whole.” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , [and] the internal consistency of each such statement . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, …
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