20-415(L) Dobrik v. Garland BIA A205 500 133 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of May, two thousand twenty-two. PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, ROBERT D. SACK, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ PAVOL DOBRIK, Petitioner, 20-415(L), v. 20-2580(Con) NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Kevin L. Dixler, Chicago, IL. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Leslie McKay, Acting Assistant Director; Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of these petitions for review of Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petitions for review are DENIED. Petitioner Pavol Dobrik, a native and citizen of Slovakia, seeks review of (1) a January 3, 2020 decision of the BIA, denying a motion to reopen, and (2) a July 20, 2020 decision, denying a subsequent motion to reconsider and reopen. In re Pavol Dobrik, No. A205 500 133 (B.I.A. Jan. 3 & July 20, 2020). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. Dobrik argues that the BIA erred in denying his motions to reopen and reconsider his claim for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) because he established that his former counsel was ineffective by failing to present evidence on the hardship Dobrik’s removal would cause his U.S. citizen children. Our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law when we review the denial of motions to reopen and reconsider related to the issue of hardship required for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); see also Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 2 516 F.3d 35, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2008) (reaffirming that jurisdiction to review a hardship determination for cancellation is limited by Section 1252(a)(2)(B)); Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the jurisdictional limitation for discretionary denials of relief applies equally to denials of motions to reopen or reconsider that relief). We have jurisdiction to consider Dobrik’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it is a constitutional claim. See Omar v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 647, 650 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We are not barred from exercising jurisdiction over an ineffective assistance of counsel claim …
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