FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PEDRO ANTONIO VASQUEZ-BORJAS, No. 17-70867 Petitioner, Agency No. v. A028-889-216 MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, OPINION Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 22, 2021 Pasadena, California Filed June 6, 2022 Before: Consuelo M. Callahan and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges, and Carol Bagley Amon, * District Judge. Opinion by Judge Forrest * The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 2 VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND SUMMARY ** Immigration Denying in part and dismissing in part Pedro Antonio Vasquez-Borjas’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that a forgery under California Penal Code § 472 is a crime involving moral turpitude. Vasquez-Borjas was convicted of forgery under Section 472 for possession of a counterfeit government seal—a Social Security card that he knew was fake. The BIA concluded that this conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude that made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Vasquez-Borjas argued that intent to defraud is not a required element under Section 472, and therefore, his forgery conviction was not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. Specifically, Vasquez-Borjas argued that Section 472 is organized into three clauses and that intent to defraud is not an element of the so-called “possession” clause under which he was convicted. Applying the categorical approach, the panel considered the elements of Section 472 and concluded that California law does not support Vasquez-Borjas’s reading of the statute. The panel explained that it is reasonable to read the statutory text as requiring that all the prohibited acts be done “with the intent to defraud another,” and that no California court has held that Section 472 has separate clauses or that the intent-to-defraud element is limited to specific clauses or ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. VASQUEZ-BORJAS V. GARLAND 3 actions. The panel also explained that California caselaw establishes that forgery requires intent to defraud and that California’s pattern jury instructions confirm that conclusion. The panel compared the elements of Section 472 to the generic federal offense. The panel explained that the court’s caselaw establishes that the generic federal definition of forgery includes fraudulent intent and, therefore, it is a crime involving moral turpitude. Because California requires proof of intent to defraud for all Section 472 offenses, the panel concluded that Section 472 is a categorical match with the federal definition of forgery, and that the BIA did not err in concluding that a Section 472 conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude. Vasquez-Borjas argued that, even if he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, he was eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)—the petty-offense exception. Vasquez- Borjas did not dispute that he failed to raise this issue …
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