United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 20-3327 ___________________________ Ana Yenzi Lesbeth Elias-Tajiboy; E.J.X. Petitioners v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States Respondent ___________________________ No. 21-2173 ___________________________ Ana Yenzi Lesbeth Elias-Tajiboy; E.J.X. Petitioners v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States Respondent ____________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ____________ Submitted: January 14, 2022 Filed: June 6, 2022 [Unpublished] ____________ Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. Despite Ana Elias-Tajiboy’s desire to remain in the United States, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied her request for asylum and withholding of removal. We now deny her petition for review. I. Gang extortion is a common problem in Guatemala. After falling prey to it, Elias-Tajiboy moved north and eventually entered the United States with her son. It was not long before they were placed in removal proceedings. She asked to remain in the United States, along with her son, on the ground that she had faced extortion and threats back home and would encounter them again if she returned. To put it in immigration-law terms, she wanted asylum or withholding of removal to avoid persecution “on account of” her membership in two “proposed social groups”: “female Guatemalan business owners” and “Guatemalan women who lack male protection.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The immigration judge did not grant relief. What was missing, among other things, was evidence supporting a “nexus” between the persecution she allegedly faced and either one of the social groups she identified. Even though Elias-Tajiboy was “the unfortunate victim of a very serious crime,” it was not clear that her -2- membership in either “social group[]” had been the reason for the extortion and threats against her. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed.1 II. The Immigration and Nationality Act vests the Attorney General with the authority to “grant asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). It is available when an alien is “unable or unwilling to return” home “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of . . . membership in a particular social group.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Here, even assuming that she faces persecution and is a member of a cognizable social group, the evidence does not connect the two. See Aguinada–Lopez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 407, 408–09 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting that an alien “must establish . . . a nexus between the persecution and membership in [a] social group”). We review the agency’s no-nexus finding for “substantial evidence.” Kanagu v. Holder, 781 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 2015); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Under this “highly deferential” standard, we can only overturn an “administrative finding” like this one if “a[] reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” to reach a “contrary” conclusion. Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1677 (2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). The record does not come close to compelling a contrary conclusion here. Elias-Tajiboy’s argument is missing quite a few logical …
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