NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 13 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT HECTOR ALVAREZ MONTANO, No. 15-73382 Petitioner, Agency No. A095-773-592 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted June 9, 2022** Pasadena, California Before: M. SMITH, BADE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. Hector Alvarez Montano, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review. 1. Alvarez Montano argues that the agency erred in concluding that the threats he received from the Colombian guerilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) lacked a nexus to his actual or imputed political opinion. We review the agency’s nexus determination for substantial evidence. Sagaydak v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2005). To establish persecution on account of an actual or imputed political opinion, Alvarez Montano was required to show (1) that he held a political opinion or that his alleged persecutors believed he did, and (2) he was or would be persecuted on account of that political opinion. See Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2000). Alvarez Montano does not argue that he held a political opinion, and the evidence does not compel the conclusion that FARC persecuted Alvarez Montano based on an imputed political opinion. The record reflects that members of FARC threatened Alvarez Montano in an effort to induce him to betray his wealthy employer and to join their organization. Substantial evidence therefore supports the agency’s conclusion that the threats arose out FARC’s desire to punish Alvarez Montano for his refusal to cooperate, rather than for an imputed political opinion. See, e.g., Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated in part on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2 2013) (en banc); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482–83 (1992). Moreover, Alvarez Montano’s assertion that his employer sold horses to the Colombian military, and thus had ties to the government, does not compel the conclusion that FARC imputed any political motive to Alvarez Montano. 2. Alvarez Montano argues that he belongs to the social groups of (1) people who have rejected advances by FARC and (2) bodyguards for wealthy businessmen with ties to the government, and that the agency erred in determining that these groups were not cognizable. We accord Skidmore deference to the agency’s determinations regarding cognizability because the BIA decision is …
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