Filed 2/28/23 P. v. Sinigur CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ---- THE PEOPLE, C091622 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 18FE004949) v. VLADIMIR SINIGUR, Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Vladimir Sinigur committed 18 sex offenses against his daughter, N.S., and two sons, I.S. and C.S. Sixteen of these offenses were committed against N.S., who was six years old when the abuse came to light. With respect to these crimes, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of sexual intercourse (counts one and three), five counts of oral copulation (counts five, seven, nine, 11, and 13), one count of sexual penetration (count 15), and eight counts of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 years (counts two, four, six, eight, 10, 12, 14, and 16). The remaining two crimes, two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 years 1 (counts 17 and 18), were committed against I.S. and C.S., who were four and seven years old when the abuse came to light. The jury also found defendant committed the foregoing crimes against more than one victim within the meaning of the One Strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61).1 Pursuant to this alternate sentencing scheme, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 250 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for lewd or lascivious conduct with his sons; (2) defendant’s convictions for lewd or lascivious conduct with his daughter must also be reversed because they violate section 954; (3) defendant’s trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to object to the admission of his police interview on the ground that defendant neither expressly nor impliedly waived his Miranda2 rights; (4) his trial counsel also provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of a pretext conversation between defendant and his wife; (5) the trial court prejudicially erred and violated defendant’s federal constitutional rights by misinstructing the jury regarding the requirement of unanimity; (6) the cumulative prejudicial effect of the foregoing assertions of error requires reversal; and (7) various sentencing errors occurred, including the claims that (A) all but one multiple-victim “sentence enhancement” must be vacated because the prosecution alleged this “enhancement” with respect to only one count, and (B) the matter must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court did not understand that it had the discretion to sentence defendant to concurrent as opposed to consecutive terms of imprisonment. The Attorney General concedes the latter point. We accept the concession and will therefore vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the matter for …
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