NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 15 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DEMYAN AGUIAR, AKA Aguiar Demyan, No. 19-70888 AKA Demyan Unknown, Agency No. A073-173-921 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted July 15, 2022** Pasadena, California Before: BENNETT and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and FOOTE,*** District Judge. Petitioner Demyan Aguiar, a Brazilian citizen, petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his request for remand to pursue adjustment of status and upholding the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that found him ineligible for cancellation of removal and * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). *** The Honorable Elizabeth E. Foote, United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. that ordered him removed to Brazil. We have jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition. 1. During his removal proceedings, Aguiar took the first step towards attempting to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident by having his U.S. citizen wife file an I-130 petition with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). After granting Aguiar several continuances while awaiting USCIS’s decision on the I-130 petition, the IJ ultimately declined to wait any further, proceeded with a removal hearing in January 2018, and ordered Aguiar to be removed. The IJ did so after concluding that, even if the I-130 petition was granted, Aguiar had made an insufficient showing that he would merit a favorable exercise of discretion so as to be granted adjustment of status. After Aguiar appealed to the BIA, the I-130 petition was granted, and Aguiar then moved to remand the matter to the IJ. However, the BIA concluded that Aguiar had “not demonstrated eligibility for adjustment of status in the exercise of discretion,” and it therefore both denied the motion for remand and upheld the IJ’s denial of a continuance of the removal proceedings. The standards governing a motion to remand “are for all practical purposes the same” as for a motion to reopen, see Rodriguez v. INS, 841 F.2d 865, 867 (9th Cir. 1987), and the BIA may properly deny such a motion if, inter alia, “the 2 movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief which he sought.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Even assuming Aguiar would be eligible for discretionary adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a),1 we find no basis to set aside the BIA’s determination that Aguiar failed to show that he merited a favorable exercise of discretion. The BIA …
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