Elias Viuda De Miranda v. Garland


Case: 21-1195, 04/07/2023, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 1 of 5 FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 7 2023 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARIA ERNESTINA ELIAS VIUDA DE No. 21-1195 MIRANDA; ASAEL BALMORE MIRANDA; GENESIS SOFIA Agency Nos. A208-181-665 MIRANDA, A208-181-666 A208-181-667 Petitioners, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted March 15, 2023 Pasadena, California Before: TASHIMA, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Case: 21-1195, 04/07/2023, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 2 of 5 Petitioner Maria Ernestina Elias Viuda de Miranda, on behalf of herself and her two minor children,1 all natives and citizens of El Salvador, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board). The Board dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of a decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ), who denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).2 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review “the agency’s factual findings . . . for substantial evidence.” Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). We deny the petition. 1. The BIA applied the correct legal standard in its nexus analysis for withholding of removal. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358, 360 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that, to qualify for asylum, an applicant must show that a protected ground is “one central reason” for the persecution, but that for withholding of removal, an applicant must show only that the protected ground is “a reason,” which is “a less demanding standard than ‘one central reason’”). Although the IJ found that Petitioner’s membership in the proposed social group “was not the central reason or even a central reason for the harm,” the BIA 1 Petitioner’s children’s claims are derivative of hers. For ease of reference, we will refer to the claims as Petitioner’s alone. 2 Petitioner does not challenge the denial of CAT relief and we do not address it. 2 Case: 21-1195, 04/07/2023, DktEntry: 33.1, Page 3 of 5 concluded that it was not “a ‘central reason,’ or even ‘a reason,’ for the harm she experienced or the harm she fears.” Thus, the Board applied the correct standard. Petitioner argues that because the IJ misstated the nexus standard, the BIA must have engaged in improper factfinding when it concluded that Petitioner had not satisfied the “a reason” standard. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A) (“The Board will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding cases.”). This argument fails because the Board permissibly relied on the IJ’s factual finding that “it was general gang recruitment,” to conclude that Petitioner suffered harm based on “criminal acts and violence,” which “is insufficient to support an asylum or withholding of removal claim.” See Hernandez-Galand v. Garland, 996 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th …

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