Marroquin Blanco v. Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Oscar Leonel Marroquin Blanco, No. 21-450 Petitioner, Agency No. A027-529-909 v. MEMORANDUM* Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted March 16, 2023 Pasadena, California Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Oscar Leonel Marroquin Blanco, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of a 2021 Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) 2020 order denying Marroquin Blanco’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (CAT), as well as special rule cancellation pursuant to Section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36–3. American Relief Act (NACARA). Marroquin Blanco seeks review of the NACARA decision only. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant in part and dismiss in part. We exercise jurisdiction over NACARA claims only to the extent they raise colorable constitutional or legal issues, which we review de novo. See Roy v. Barr, 960 F.3d 1175, 1181 (9th Cir. 2020); Monroy v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016). We lack jurisdiction to review predicate factual findings underlying the agency’s determination of eligibility for NACARA relief. Ixcot v. Holder, 646 F.3d 1202, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2011). Even for forms of relief committed to the agency’s discretion, the BIA is not free to ignore arguments raised by a petitioner, and “errs if it ignores material issues or arguments raised on appeal.” Zamorano v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). If we conclude that “the Board relied on an incorrect legal premise” in declining to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, we “remand to the BIA so it may exercise its authority against the correct legal background.” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On appeal, Marroquin Blanco argues the Board legally erred in denying his request for special cancellation under NACARA. In 2020, an IJ determined that she lacked jurisdiction to hear Marroquin Blanco’s NACARA claim on two grounds: (1) his application was not “pending adjudication by the service,” and 2 21–450 (2) he had already filed a motion to reopen. Reviewing this decision in 2021, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s first conclusion that she lacked jurisdiction because Marroquin Blanco’s application was no longer pending. Although the government initially defended this ground, it has subsequently disavowed the argument that a non-citizen’s asylum application must be “pending adjudication by the Service” to qualify for NACARA relief. We observe that the BIA appears to have misread 8 C.F.R. § 1240.60’s definition of …

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