20-2197 Warner v. Garland BIA Conroy, IJ A088 445 267 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of May, two thousand twenty-three. PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ Dijon Imran Warner, AKA Mustard Unknown, Petitioner, v. 20-2197 Merrick B. Garland, United States Attorney General, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Craig Relles, Law Offices of Craig Relles, White Plains, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director; Lance L. Jolley, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Dijon Imran Warner, a native and citizen of St. Kitts and Nevis, seeks review of the BIA’s decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 1 In re Dijon Imran Warner, No. A 088 445 267 (B.I.A. July 6, 2020), aff’g No. A 088 445 267 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Jan. 24, 2020). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We consider the IJ’s decision as adopted and modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. See Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). The agency’s findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Upon such review, we conclude that the record supports the agency’s determination that Warner failed to establish either past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution or torture. To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must establish past persecution or that he will more likely than not be persecuted in the future and that such persecution was, or will be, because of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1), (2). The agency did not err in concluding that …
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