NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________ No. 21-3099 ______ STEPHEN BRANCH, Appellant v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY; SEAN OUNAN; SHARON BOYLE _____ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-20-cv-02323) District Judge: Hon. Chad F. Kenney ____________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) May 17, 2023 ____________ Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges. (Opinion filed: June 14, 2023) ___________ OPINION* ___________ PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. On January 29, 2020, Temple University fired Stephen Branch, an African American male, who had worked there as a roving facilities engineer for sixteen years. Temple’s stated reason for terminating Branch’s employment was that he skipped work for three consecutive days in January 2020 and lied about his absence. Challenging that * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. stated ground as pretextual, Branch initiated this suit against Temple, his direct supervisor, and a human resources manager for race discrimination and retaliation under federal and state civil rights laws, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e-2(a); 43 Pa. Stat. § 955(a), and for interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 2612. In exercising jurisdiction over those claims, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1367, the District Court permitted discovery, denied Temple’s motion for summary judgment, see Branch v. Temple Univ., 554 F. Supp. 3d 642, 665 (E.D. Pa. 2021), and held a jury trial. Shortly before trial, Branch moved in limine to exclude after-acquired evidence, or alternatively, to bifurcate the trial into liability and damages phases. Branch did not dispute that Temple could support its case with material it reviewed before terminating Branch, such as Temple’s logbooks, swipe card records, and surveillance footage showing Branch leaving campus during his shift. But through his motion, Branch argued that Temple could not rely on evidence acquired after it terminated him. That evidence, obtained in discovery, included time records from a second employer showing that, at various times over the years, Branch simultaneously worked a second job during his Temple shift. It also included incriminating text messages from Branch. The District Court denied Branch’s requests and permitted Temple’s Director of Labor Relations to testify about the after-acquired evidence, subject to limiting instructions. The jury returned a verdict for Temple. Through a timely appeal, Branch invoked this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2107(a). He now disputes the District Court’s rulings on the introduction of the after-acquired evidence and the testimony of Temple’s Director of 2 Labor Relations. For the reasons below, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. I. The Limited Relevance of After-Acquired Evidence in a Discrimination Case As a general matter, a claim of race discrimination in employment rests on proof that race caused or motivated an employer to take an adverse employment action against an employee. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, …
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