(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus PUGIN v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 22–23. Argued April 17, 2023—Decided June 22, 2023* In two immigration proceedings, noncitizens Fernando Cordero-Garcia and Jean Francois Pugin were determined removable from the United States on the ground that they had convictions for aggravated felo- nies—namely, offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” See 8 U. S. C. §§1101(a)(43)(S), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). On appeal, the Ninth Cir- cuit concluded that Cordero-Garcia’s state conviction for dissuading a witness from reporting a crime did not constitute an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” because the state offense did not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Pugin’s state conviction for accessory after the fact constituted an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” even if the state offense did not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. Held: An offense may “relat[e] to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) even if the offense does not require that an investiga- tion or proceeding be pending. Federal law provides that noncitizens convicted of a federal or state crime constituting an “aggravated fel- ony” are removable from the United States. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Con- gress expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” in 1996 to include offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” §1101(a)(43)(S). Diction- ary definitions, federal laws, state laws, and the Model Penal Code show that federal or state obstruction offenses “relat[e] to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. This extensive body of —————— * Together with No. 22–331, Garland, Attorney General v. Cordero- Garcia, aka Cordero, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 2 PUGIN v. GARLAND Syllabus authority reflects common sense. Individuals can obstruct the process of justice even when an investigation or proceeding is not pending. In- deed, obstruction of justice is often “most effective” when it prevents “an investigation or proceeding from commencing in the first place.” Brief for Attorney General 15. The Court declines to adopt an inter- pretation of the statute that would exclude many common obstruction offenses from the definition of aggravated felony under §1101(a)(43)(S). Finally, the phrase “relating to” resolves any doubt about the scope of §1101(a)(43)(S), because it ensures that the statute covers offenses having a connection with obstruction of justice—which surely covers common obstruction offenses that can occur when an in- vestigation or proceeding is not pending. Pugin’s and Cordero-Garcia’s contrary arguments lack merit. …
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Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals