(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus UNITED STATES v. HANSEN CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 22–179. Argued March 27, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023 Respondent Helaman Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to U. S. citizenship through “adult adoption.” But that was a scam. Though there is no path to citizenship through “adult adoption,” Han- sen earned nearly $2 million from his scheme. The United States charged Hansen with, inter alia, violating 8 U. S. C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” Hansen was convicted and moved to dismiss the clause (iv) charges on First Amend- ment overbreadth grounds. The District Court rejected Hansen’s ar- gument, but the Ninth Circuit concluded that clause (iv) was unconsti- tutionally overbroad. Held: Because §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Pp. 4–20. (a) Hansen’s First Amendment overbreadth challenge rests on the claim that clause (iv) punishes so much protected speech that it cannot be applied to anyone, including him. A court will hold a statute facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if the law “prohibits a substan- tial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 292. In such a cir- cumstance, society’s interest in free expression outweighs its interest in the statute’s lawful applications. Otherwise, courts must handle unconstitutional applications as they usually do—case-by-case. Pp. 4– 5. (b) The issue here is whether Congress used “encourage” and “in- duce” in clause (iv) as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (thus capturing only a narrow band of speech) or instead 2 UNITED STATES v. HANSEN Syllabus as those terms are used in ordinary conversation (thus encompassing a broader swath). Pp. 5–9. (1) Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an unlawful act, and facilitation—i.e., aiding and abetting—is the provi- sion of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense’s commission. Neither requires lending physical aid; for both, words may be enough. And both require an intent to bring about a particular unlawful act. The terms “encourage” and “induce,” found in clause (iv), are among the “most common” verbs used to denote solicitation and facilitation. 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §13.2(a). Their specialized usage is displayed in the …
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