FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 7 2023 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CESAR PAZ-NEGRETE, AKA Cesar Paz, No. 16-73889 AKA Cesar Negrete Paz, Agency No. A019-342-111 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted June 14, 2023** Pasadena, California Before: BYBEE and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District Judge. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Cesar Paz-Negrete petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision finding him removable based on an aggravated felony conviction and denying his applications for asylum, withholding, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). On appeal, Paz-Negrete has also filed a motion to remand for termination of his removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review and the motion to remand. 1. As a threshold matter, Paz-Negrete argues in his motion to remand that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction because his Notice to Appear (NTA) did not state the time and date of his removal hearing. This argument is foreclosed by our en banc decision in United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, which held that a defective NTA does not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction. 39 F.4th 1187, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 755 (2023). 2. Next, Paz-Negrete argues the IJ erred by finding him removable based on an aggravated-felony conviction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Paz-Negrete was convicted of violating California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), which criminalizes “an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm.” The IJ concluded this conviction constituted an aggravated felony 2 because § 245(a)(1) is a “crime of violence.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 8 U.S.C. § 16(a) defines a “crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” The generic federal definition of “crime of violence” requires both violent force and intentional or knowing conduct. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9–11 (2004); Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1833 (2021). Paz-Negrete argues that § 245(a)(1) is broader than § 16(a) because its elements can be satisfied by an offensive touching or reckless or negligent conduct, but our …
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