FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ROCIO AURORA MARTINEZ-DE No. 15-70759 RYAN, Petitioner, Agency No. A096-025-359 v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney OPINION General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted July 9, 2018* San Francisco, California Filed July 17, 2018 Before: Susan P. Graber and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges, and Ivan L.R. Lemelle,** District Judge. Opinion by Judge Graber * The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). ** The Honorable Ivan L.R. Lemelle, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. 2 MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. SESSIONS SUMMARY*** Immigration The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of Martinez-de Ryan’s application for cancellation of removal on the ground that she was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The panel rejected the government’s contention that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply at all to any grounds of inadmissibility, such as crimes involving turpitude. Applying Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge to the phrase “crime of moral turpitude”) and Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957) (following Jordan), the panel held that the crime involving moral turpitude statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), is not unconstitutionally vague. The panel concluded that Jordan and Tseung Chu remain good law in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (concluding that the residual clause of the federal criminal code’s definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (extending Johnson’s holding to the immigration context). The panel explained that it was obliged to follow on-point Supreme Court precedent— here, Jordan—even if later Supreme Court cases cast some doubt on its general reasoning. The panel also pointed out *** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. SESSIONS 3 that Johnson and Dimaya interpret statutory “residual” clauses whose wording does not include the phrase “moral turpitude” and which are not tethered to recognized common law principles. COUNSEL K. Alexandra Monaco, The Monaco Law Group Ltd., Las Vegas, Nevada, for Petitioner. Allison Frayer, Trial Attorney; Melissa Neiman-Keltin, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent. 4 MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. SESSIONS OPINION GRABER, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Rocio Aurora Martinez-de Ryan is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without being inspected and admitted or paroled. She timely seeks review of a decision issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed an immigration judge’s decision pretermitting her application for cancellation of removal and ordering her removed from the United States. She argues that the statutory phrase “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. ...
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