UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 17-1526 SHENG DA DONG, Petitioner, v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Argued: May 9, 2018 Decided: July 20, 2018 Before THACKER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition for review granted and remanded for further proceedings by unpublished opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Shedd joined. ARGUED: Henry Zhang, ZHANG & ASSOCIATES, P.C., New York, New York, for Petitioner. Sergio F. Sarkany, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Kiley Kane, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge: Sheng Da Dong, a native and citizen of China, seeks asylum and withholding of removal from the United States. If repatriated, Dong fears persecution by Chinese authorities, who already once have detained, interrogated, and beaten him unconscious for his association with Falun Gong, an outlawed spiritual practice. Because Dong has suffered past persecution, he is entitled to a presumption that his fear of future persecution is “well-founded,” as required to qualify for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that the presumption was rebutted by a showing of fundamentally changed circumstances – specifically, that Chinese authorities no longer perceive Dong as a dissident deserving of punishment. Alternatively, the Board concluded, the presumption was rebutted because the Immigration Judge properly found that Dong could avoid future persecution by relocating within China. On both these grounds, the Board denied asylum and withholding of removal. We conclude that the Board erred in holding that the government rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution. The burden in this case fell squarely on the government, and there is not substantial record evidence to support a finding that the government established, by a preponderance of the evidence, the requisite “changed circumstances.” As for whether future persecution could be avoided through relocation, the government concedes that the burden improperly was shifted to Dong on that issue. Accordingly, we vacate the Board’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 3 I. We begin with the statutory and regulatory background relevant to Dong’s petition. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives the Attorney General the discretion to “grant asylum to applicants who qualify as ‘refugees.’” Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2015). A “refugee” is an applicant who, among other things, is “unable or unwilling to return” to his home country “because of persecution or a well- founded fear of persecution.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). This appeal turns on whether Dong qualifies as a refugee under the “well-founded fear of persecution” standard. Ordinarily, an applicant for relief bears the burden of showing a well-founded fear of persecution. ...
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