RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 18a0227p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ │ > Nos. 17-2157/2183 v. │ │ │ FRANK RICHARDSON, │ Defendant-Appellant. │ ┘ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor. No. 2:10-cr-20397-2—John Corbett O’Meara, District Judge. Argued: August 1, 2018 Decided and Filed: October 11, 2018 Before: COOK, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Michael R. Dezsi, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL R. DEZSI, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Shane Cralle, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael R. Dezsi, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL R. DEZSI, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Shane Cralle, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. _________________ OPINION _________________ NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. On his second appeal to this court, Defendant-Appellant Frank Richardson asks us to overturn his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for aiding and Nos. 17-2157/2183 United States v. Richardson Page 2 abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence. On his first appeal, we affirmed his conviction and sentence in full. But while that appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that part of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of a violent felony was unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Although Richardson was not convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act, he petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, arguing that Johnson nonetheless called part of his conviction into question. Richardson contends that the residual clause of § 924(c) is unconstitutional because its definition of the term, crime of violence, is similar to the language at issue in Johnson. The Court granted Richardson’s petition, vacated our judgment, and remanded the matter to this court. In turn, we vacated Richardson’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Richardson’s original sentence should stand given Johnson. Without determining whether § 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, we affirm Richardson’s conviction under § 924(c)’s force clause, which supplies a separate definition of crime of violence. We also conclude that our remand limited the district court’s inquiry to Johnson-related issues and that the district court properly refrained from considering Richardson’s other arguments about alleged deficiencies in the indictment and the trial court’s jury instructions—arguments that he could have raised in his first appeal but did not. Finally, we hold that Richardson’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision to reinstate Richardson’s original sentence. I. Frank Richardson participated in a series of armed robberies of electronics stores in and around Detroit, Michigan, between February and May 2010. At least one robber used a gun during each robbery. Although Richardson planned each heist and served as a lookout, he never entered a store while a robbery occurred. United States v. Richardson, 793 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 2015). Law enforcement ...
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