UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 18-4151 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. FREDY MARIONY ALVARADO-CALDERON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00413-RDB-1) Submitted: November 29, 2018 Decided: December 7, 2018 Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, Joanna Silver, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Hannah Roberts, Law Clerk, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert K. Hur, United States Attorney, Brian M. Fish, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Fredy Mariony Alvarado-Calderon appeals his 24-month sentence imposed by the district court after he pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to illegal reentry of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b) (2012). He contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court gave too much weight to his criminal and immigration history; several of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors considered by the court actually weigh in favor of a lower sentence; and the district court impermissibly based its sentence on political factors relating to immigration. Finding no error, we affirm. “We ‘review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). This review entails appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We consider whether the sentence imposed is substantively reasonable based on “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “While a district court’s explanation for the sentence must support the degree of the variance, it need not find extraordinary circumstances to justify a deviation from the Guidelines.” United States v. Spencer, 848 F.3d 324, 327 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the district court; rather, it must determine whether the district court’s exercise of discretion, considering the law and the facts, was arbitrary or capricious.” 2 United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 348 (4th Cir. 2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Turning to Alvarado-Calderon’s first argument, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying heavily on Alvarado-Calderon’s criminal and immigration history. “[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011). Indeed, it is “quite reasonable for the sentencing court to have attached great weight to a single factor.” United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 476 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Standing alone, the district court’s heavy emphasis ...
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