FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ANTONIO ISLAS-VELOZ, AKA No. 15-73120 Antonio Islas, Petitioner, Agency No. A060-299-672 v. MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting OPINION Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 27, 2018* Seattle, Washington Filed February 4, 2019 Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, M. Margaret McKeown, and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge McKeown; Concurrence by Judge W. Fletcher * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2 ISLAS-VELOZ V. WHITAKER SUMMARY** Immigration Denying Antonio Islas-Veloz’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that Supreme Court and circuit precedent required rejecting Islas-Veloz’s contentions that: 1) the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” was unconstitutionally vague; and 2) his conviction for communication with a minor for immoral purposes in violation of Revised Code of Washington § 9.68A.090 is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. The panel concluded that, in assessing the constitutional status of the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude,” it remains bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), in which the Court held that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” was not unconstitutionally vague. The panel also explained that Court’s more recent decisions in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), did not reopen inquiry into the constitutionality of the phrase. The panel further observed that this court has repeatedly echoed the holding in De George, noting that the court recently held in Martinez-De Ryan v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2018), that the phrase is not unconstitutionally vague. The panel also concluded that this court’s precedent foreclosed Islas-Veloz’s alternate claim that his conviction ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. ISLAS-VELOZ V. WHITAKER 3 for communicating with a minor for immoral purposes is not a crime of moral turpitude. Concurring, Judge W. Fletcher wrote that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Johnson and Dimaya should lead the panel, were it not bound by this court’s precedent in Martinez-De Ryan, to conclude that the phrase “crime of moral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague when used as a basis for the removal of a noncitizen. Observing that this circuit acknowledges a distinction between fraud and non- fraud crimes involving moral turpitude, Judge W. Fletcher wrote that non-fraud cases comprise the great bulk of crimes involving moral turpitude today and that the definition of non-fraud crimes involving moral turpitude is hopelessly and irredeemably vague. COUNSEL Manuel Rios, Rios & Cruz P.S., Seattle, Washington, for Petitioner. Laura M.L. Maroldy, Trial Attorney; John S. Hogan, Assistant Director; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent. 4 ISLAS-VELOZ V. WHITAKER OPINION McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals