Amandeep Singh v. William Barr


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AMANDEEP SINGH, No. 15-71923 Petitioner, Agency No. A201-290-567 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted March 14, 2019 San Francisco, California Before: M. SMITH, WATFORD, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. Amandeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from the decision of an immigration judge (IJ) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We deny the petition for review. 1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Singh did not * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Page 2 of 4 show he was a victim of past persecution. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1); 1208.16(b)(1). Singh and his friends initially approached his attackers, members of Dera Sacha Sauda, at a religious recruitment event to stop them from saying “wrong things about [his] religion.” In promoting their own religion, Dera Sacha Sauda members disagreed with Singh’s religion and chased him out of their event. Two months later, Dera Sacha Sauda members encountered Singh alone and after recognizing Singh from the disruption of their religious event, they beat him. “Persecution is an ‘extreme concept,’” He v. Holder, 749 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009)). Although the beating could support a finding of past persecution, see Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2018), that fact alone does not compel such a finding, see Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, past persecution must be “committed by the government or forces the government is unable or unwilling to control.” Chand v. I.N.S., 222 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The agency credited Singh’s testimony that after he was severely beaten by members of another religious group, the police demanded a 25,000 rupee bribe to help him. But this evidence alone is not enough to compel the conclusion that the government was unable or unwilling to control the people who harmed Singh. See Kusnanto v. Sessions, 730 F. App’x 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that “two Page 3 of 4 incidents where the police requested payment are not sufficient to establish acquiescence on the part of the government.”) After the police demanded a bribe, Singh never tried going to them again, nor did he try contacting anyone else in the government. In Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2010), upon which Singh relies, the fact that the Ghanaian police demanded bribes for their services contributed to our conclusion that the record compelled a finding that the government was unable or unwilling to protect the petitioner. ...

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