In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-18-00090-CV EWING INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. AND CHARLES CANDLER, Appellants V. TEXAS INDEPENDENT AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATION, AND JUAN SABILLON AND BRENT RHODES, INDIVIDUALLY, Appellees On Appeal from the 200th District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court No. D-1-GN-18-003251 Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss MEMORANDUM OPINION When the Texas Independent Automobile Dealers Association (TIADA) revoked the membership of Ewing Insurance Services, Inc., and reported to TIADA members that it had taken such action, Ewing and its president, Charles Candler, sued TIADA and two of its board members, Juan Sabillon and Brent Rhodes, individually, alleging defamation, negligent misrepresentation, business disparagement, 1 and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2 Ewing and Candler sought actual damages, lost profits, exemplary damages, and attorney fees. The trial court granted TIADA’s motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. On appeal, Ewing contends that the trial court erred in granting TIADA’s motion for summary judgment because the motion was directed to a superseded petition, at least some of TIADA’s arguments should have been first addressed by special exceptions, the court applied the wrong limitations period to Ewing’s claims, privileges did not apply to Sabillon and Rhodes, the court erroneously granted TIADA’s objections to Ewing’s summary judgment evidence before denying Ewing’s motion for summary judgment, and it erred by overruling Ewing’s objections to TIADA’s summary judgment evidence. 1 Ewing titled this claim “intentional interference with business relations and business disparagement,” but, because tortious interference with contract requires that the defendant’s conduct constitute an independent tort, we address this as a business disparagement claim. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Tex. 2001). 2 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We are unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 We reverse the summary judgment only as to Ewing’s claims for negligent misrepresentation and remand that portion of the case for further proceedings. Except for that limited reversal, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment. We reach that disposition, because (1) the disposition of the negligent-misrepresentation claims was premature without resort to special-exception practice; (2) TIADA’s motion for summary judgment was broad enough to cover the claims and evidence raised in Ewing’s latest pleading; (3) Ewing’s argument regarding the continuing-tort doctrine is moot; (4) Ewing’s argument on appeal regarding its claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is forfeited due to inadequate briefing; (5) the issue of privilege is moot on appeal, given Ewing’s forfeiture of any attack on the “truth” defense; (6) there was no reversible error in sustaining TIADA’s objections to Candler’s affidavit; (7) Ewing’s cross-motion for summary judgment was not before the trial court for hearing; ...
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