NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 19 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT WILSON ENRIQUE LAGOS-LAGOS, No. 16-73625 AKA Wilson Enrique Lagos, AKA Ramos Juan Wilson, Agency No. A042-129-847 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted April 17, 2019** San Francisco, California Before: THOMAS and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and VRATIL,*** District Judge. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. Wilson Enrique Lagos-Lagos (Lagos) petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied Lagos a waiver of inadmissibility under former Immigration and Naturalization Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988), and affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Because the BIA cited Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), and provided its own review of the evidence, we review both the IJ and the BIA’s decision. See Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2011). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition. 1. Neither of Lagos’s two arguments relating to the BIA’s denial of his application for a section 212(c) waiver presents a colorable question of law. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over those claims. See Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we have jurisdiction to review only “colorable” constitutional claims or questions of law). Lagos argues that, because the IJ cited the incorrect standard when denying him relief under section 212(c), the BIA erred by not reviewing Lagos’s claim under the correct standard. That contention, however, “attempt[s] to cloak” his actual argument that the IJ inappropriately weighed the factors “in the garb of a question of law.” Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009). 2 Such a claim is unreviewable. See Palma-Rojas v. INS, 244 F.3d 1191, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) (no jurisdiction over claim where BIA balanced the equities in favor of petitioner against the adverse matters because the denial was a “clear example of a discretionary decision under § 212(c)”). We also lack jurisdiction to address Lagos’s claim that the BIA erred in determining that he was ineligible for relief under section 212(c). Lagos argues that because he committed his offense on July 6, 1990—before the restrictions on relief went into effect—the restrictions cannot be applied retroactively. Our case law squarely forecloses that argument, however, and thus Lagos fails to raise a colorable question of law. See Robles Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2018) (It is the “fact of conviction ...
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