BLD-240 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 19-1559 ___________ LORENZO RUFINO-SILVA, a/k/a Tomas Velasquez, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent ____________________________________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A088-231-993) Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy ____________________________________ Submitted on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 July 18, 2019 Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed July 19, 2019) ___________ OPINION* ___________ PER CURIAM Lorenzo Rufino-Silva petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen. The Government has filed a motion for * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. summary disposition. We will grant the Government’s motion and dismiss the petition for review in part and deny it in part. Rufino-Silva, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1998. In 2010, he was charged with being removable because he had entered the United States without being admitted or paroled. An Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charge, denied Rufino-Silva’s application for cancellation of removal, and ordered his removal, while granting his request for voluntary departure. In June 2014, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in all respects. In June 2018, Rufino-Silva filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. He sought reopening to pursue a new application for cancellation of removal, in which he alleged that his removal would result in an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his United-States-citizen son. The BIA denied the motion, concluding both that Rufino-Silva was statutorily precluded from obtaining cancellation-of-removal relief due to his failure to comply with the grant of voluntary departure and that the motion to reopen was untimely. Rufino-Silva filed a timely petition for review. The Government filed a motion for summary disposition, and Rufino-Silva filed a response in opposition. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the BIA’s denial of Rufino-Silva’s motion to reopen.1 The BIA’s decision is entitled to “broad deference,” 1 We lack jurisdiction to review the underlying order of removal. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405–06 (1995). 2 Fei Yan Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003)), and “will not be disturbed unless [it is] found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004)). At the outset, we note that, in response to the Government’s motion for summary disposition, Rufino-Silva argues exclusively that the removal order should be set aside under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), because the notice to appear was defective.2 However, as he acknowledges, he did not raise this claim before the BIA. Rufino-Silva therefore failed to exhaust this claim, and we lack jurisdiction to review it. ...
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