Fernando Diaz-Quirazco v. William Barr


FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT FERNANDO DIAZ-QUIRAZCO, No. 16-72387 Petitioner, Agency No. v. A200-877-802 WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. OPINION On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 11, 2018 Portland, Oregon Filed July 23, 2019 Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Richard R. Clifton, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Callahan; Dissent by Judge Fisher 2 DIAZ-QUIRAZCO V. BARR SUMMARY * Immigration Denying Fernando Diaz-Quirazco’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel: (1) deferred to the BIA’s interpretation that the categorical approach does not apply to determining whether an alien’s violation of a protection order makes him ineligible for cancellation of removal; and (2) deferred to the BIA’s conclusion that the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of “conviction” does not require an underlying offense to be a labeled a crime as long as the proceedings are criminal in nature. The BIA concluded that Diaz-Quirazco was ineligible for cancellation of removal on the basis that an Oregon Court had entered a judgment against him of Contempt of Court under Oregon Revised Statutes § 33.015 for violating a restraining order. First, the panel deferred, under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the BIA’s interpretation, in Matter of Medina-Jimenez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 399 (BIA 2018), and Matter of Obshatko, 27 I. & N. Dec. 173 (BIA 2017), that 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), the provision that renders an alien ineligible for cancellation of removal if the alien has been “convicted of an offense under section . . . 1227(a)(2),” does not require analysis under the categorical approach to determine whether an alien’s violation of a protection order renders him convicted of an * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. DIAZ-QUIRAZCO V. BARR 3 offense under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), the statute that provides that an alien is removable if a court determines he “has engaged in conduct that violates a protection order.” Under Chevron step one, the panel concluded that the presence of the word “convicted” in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) and its absence from § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), renders the statutory language ambiguous regarding the applicability of the categorical approach. Under step two of Chevron, the panel concluded the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the statute, explaining that the BIA articulated a two-step approach for analyzing this issue: (1) whether the offense resulted in a “conviction,” as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A); and (2) whether the State court found that the alien engaged in conduct that violates the relevant portion of a protection order, as directed by § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Second, the panel accorded Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation that § 1101(a)(48)(A), which defines “conviction,” does not require the underlying offense to be labeled as a crime so long as the proceeding was ...

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