[J-85-2018] [MO: Dougherty, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 760 CAP : Appellee : Appeal from the Judgment of : Sentence entered on June 16, 2017 : in the Court of Common Pleas, v. : Lancaster County, Criminal Division at : CP-36-CR-0004095-2015. (Post : Sentence Motions denied on June 28, LEETON JAHWANZA THOMAS, : 2017.) : Appellant : ARGUED: December 4, 2018 CONCURRING OPINION JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: August 20, 2019 In this appeal from the judgment of sentence for two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder, Leeton Jahwanza Thomas challenges several evidentiary rulings which the Majority affirms. In particular, Thomas challenges: (1) the manner in which the trial court assessed the competency of a testifying victim; (2) the trial court’s conclusion that this witness was competent; (3) the trial court’s refusal to permit Thomas to introduce the testimony of an expert in the reliability of eyewitness identification; and (4) the trial court’s refusal to preclude mention of Thomas’ immigration status. I agree with the Majority’s decision to affirm Thomas’ judgment of sentence. Nonetheless, on several points underlying that decision, my reasoning differs from the Majority’s. In particular, as I discuss below, with respect to the Majority’s sufficiency analysis (Section I), I concur only in the result, as I would hesitate to consider P.S.’s out- of-court identification of Thomas. As well, I concur only in the result regarding the Majority’s conclusion (Section II(A)) that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in holding a competency colloquy as opposed to a competency hearing or evaluation. With respect to the Majority’s conclusions that the trial court’s competency colloquy was adequate and that the trial court’s competency determination is entitled to deference (Section II(B)), I concur in the result on harmless error grounds. With regard to the Majority’s determination that the trial court may have abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Thomas’ immigration status (Section IV), I would conclude with certainty that there was an abuse of discretion, but , in light of the entire case against Thomas, this error was harmless. I join fully in Sections III, V and VI of the Majority Opinion. I turn first to the competency questions, which the Majority discusses in Sections II(A) and II(B). Generally, the competency of a witness is a question for the trial court, whose determination we will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Dowling, 883 A.2d 570, 576 (Pa. 2005). In Pennsylvania, a witness generally is presumed to be competent to testify, and it is incumbent upon the party challenging the testimony to establish the witness’ incompetency by clear and convincing evidence. Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27, 40 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Ware, 329 A.2d 258, 267 (Pa. 1974); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 552 A.2d 1064, 1067 (Pa. Super. 1988); Pa.R.E. 601(a). That an individual’s mental condition is impaired does not, in and of itself, render that individual incompetent as a witness. Ware, 329 A.2d at ...
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