Case: 18-13365 Date Filed: 10/08/2019 Page: 1 of 5 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 18-13365 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ Agency No. A035-362-605 GREGORY CLERMONT, a.k.a. Leviathan Lewis, Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. ________________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ________________________ (October 8, 2019) Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 18-13365 Date Filed: 10/08/2019 Page: 2 of 5 Gregory Clermont seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) final order dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his motion to reopen his deportation proceedings. He contends the 1995 Order to Show Cause (OSC) that initiated those proceedings was defective under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), as it failed to specify the time and place of his hearing, and thus, he was statutorily authorized to move to reopen those proceedings because he was never provided notice.1 After review, we dismiss Clermont’s petition because he raises his Pereira claim for the first time in his petition for review, and has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Before addressing a petitioner’s arguments on the merits, we assess our subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015). We lack jurisdiction to address an issue not raised before the BIA. Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2006). Clermont raises his Pereira claim for the first time in his petition for review in this Court, and thus has not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to that claim. 2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (providing we may review a final order 1 Generally, a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). However, a removal order may be rescinded upon a motion to reopen at any time if the alien shows that he did not receive notice. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). 2 Although this Court held in Perez-Sanchez it would not dismiss the petitioner’s Pereira 2 Case: 18-13365 Date Filed: 10/08/2019 Page: 3 of 5 of removal only if an alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available as a matter of right). Although Clermont contends he raised a Pereira-like argument before the IJ and BIA, his previous notice arguments were different than the one presented here. See Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1297 (stating to exhaust a claim, a petitioner “must have previously argued the ‘core issue now on appeal’ before the BIA”). His claims before the BIA and IJ focused on whether (1) he had been constructively provided notice, (2) his failure to appear was excusable, or (3) the equities justified reopening his case. These are in contrast to Clermont’s instant claim that he was entitled to have his deportation proceedings reopened because his 1995 OSC was statutorily deficient under the pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ...
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