FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 18 2019 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT TETYANA DORSANEO, ) No. 18-15487 ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00765-VC ) v. ) MEMORANDUM* ) EDWARD MATTHEW ) DORSANEO, ) ) Defendant-Appellant. ) ) TETYANA DORSANEO, ) No. 18-15678 ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00765-VC ) v. ) ) JEFFREY B. NEUSTADT, Counsel ) for Defendant, ) ) Appellant, ) ) EDWARD MATTHEW ) DORSANEO, ) ) Defendant. ) ) * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Vince Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 1, 2019** San Francisco, California Before: FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges. In No. 18-15487, Edward Dorsaneo (hereafter “Edward”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment1 and the district court’s underlying grant of partial judgment on the pleadings2 to Tetyana Dorsaneo (hereafter “Tetyana”) in her action against him for breach of his contract with the United States that he would provide certain financial support for Tetyana.3 In No. 18-15678, Edward’s former attorney, Jeffrey Neustadt (hereafter “Neustadt”) appeals the district court’s order sanctioning him4 for his actions in representing Edward. We affirm. (1) No. 18-15487 ** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 3 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii), 1183a(a)(1); see also Erler v. Erler, 824 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016). 4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). 2 (a) Edward argues that the district court erred when it granted Tetyana’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. We disagree. The district court’s order was for partial judgment on the pleadings. In that order, the district court determined that Edward’s obligation to support Tetyana commenced when, in reliance on the affidavit of support executed and submitted by Edward (“the I-864 contract”), she was granted lawful permanent resident (hereafter “LPR”) status. See 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(e)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1).5 Edward pled and argues that his obligation should never have attached because Tetyana made untruthful representations to him, and those induced him to marry her and sign the I-864 contract. However, nothing in the statutes, the regulations, or the I-864 contract so provides. On the contrary, as we have explained, the very purpose of the statutory scheme “is to prevent the admission to the United States of any alien who is likely at any time to become a public charge.” Erler, 824 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601(1)–(2), (5), 1182(a)(4)(A); H.R. Rep. No. 104-651, at 6, 1327 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2187, 2384. We went on to explain “that purpose is best served by interpreting the affidavit in a way that makes prospective sponsors more 5 That LPR status ...
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