UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 18-4714 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JUAN CARLOS GARCIA TORRES, a/k/a Juan Carlos Garcia, a/k/a Juan C. Garcia, a/k/a Juan Carlos Torres, a/k/a Juan C. Torres, a/k/a Juan Garcia-Turres, a/k/a Juan Carlos Torres-Garcia, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District Judge. (1:18-cr-00002-LO-1) Submitted: October 15, 2019 Decided: October 24, 2019 Before HARRIS and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Kevin E. Wilson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Juan Carlos Garcia Torres appeals his conviction for unlawful reentry after removal following a felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (2012). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Citing Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), Garcia Torres argues that the district court should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea to illegal reentry on the ground that he was legally innocent as his underlying removal order was invalid. We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012). In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that a notice to appear (NTA) that does not designate the specific time and place for the first hearing “is not a ‘notice to appear under [8 U.S.C. §] 1229(a) [2012]’” and does not terminate the alien’s period of continuous presence for purposes of cancellation of removal. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109-10 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) (2012)). The Supreme Court stated that it was addressing a “narrow question[:] . . . If the Government serves a noncitizen with a document that is labeled ‘notice to appear,’ but the document fails to specify either the time or place of the removal proceedings, does it trigger the stop-time rule?” Id. at 2110. The Court answered the question in the negative, noting that, according to statute, the relevant period of continuous presence terminates “‘when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added)). Citing § 1229(a), Garcia argues that, following Pereira, “an immigration court lacks authority to commence proceedings, or to issue an order of removal, absent service of a 2 notice to appear that specifies the time and place of the proceedings.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11). He therefore concludes that his “initial removal proceeding was void.” (Id. at 14). We recently held in United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 362-65 (4th Cir. 2019), however, that “[i]t is the ...
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