Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 24, 2019. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-18-00329-CV DARYL BARNES, Appellant V. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, CHRIS DANIEL, WILLIE FRAZIER, DEE THOMAS, STAN STEWART, MARIA DE LA ROSA, AND DERYK FIELDS, Appellees On Appeal from the 164th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2016-14432 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Daryl Barnes filed suit for claims apparently arising from events occurring in May 2009 and later. Defendants Harris County, Texas Chris Daniel, Willie Frazier, Dee Thomas, Stan Stewart, Maria De La Rosa, and Deryk Fields (collectively “appellees”) moved to dismiss the suit. The trial court granted the motion. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal.1 Appellees’ titled their motion as a “Motion to Dismiss Baseless Cause of Action Pursuant to Rule 91A.” The motion alleged the claims filed against them had no basis in law or in fact. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. Appellees also asserted they were protected from suit by governmental immunity. Specifically, appellees argued none of appellant’s claims fall within the Texas Tort Claims Act’s (“TTCA”) limited waiver of immunity. Further, appellees claimed appellant’s suit is a collateral attack on a final judgment signed September 4, 2014. Initially, we note the portion of the motion claiming immunity is, in fact, a plea to the jurisdiction. Generally, we consider a motion based on its substance not its title. Sierra Club v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’l. Quality, 188 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). A plea to the jurisdiction is not necessarily a particular procedural vehicle. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2004). It is the substance of the argument—that the suit should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction—and not the vehicle used that is determinative. Id. Immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004); Vill. of Tiki Island v. Premier Tierra Holdings Inc., 555 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Thus, we treat appellant’s claim that it is immune from suit as a plea to the jurisdiction. Simons, 140 S.W.3d at 349. 1 Demeatrice Goff was also a plaintiff in the suit. However, Goff did not sign Barnes’ notice of appeal or file her own notice of appeal and therefore is not a party to this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.1(b) (“A party not represented by counsel must sign any document that the party files[.]”); see also Paselk v. Rabun, 293 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. denied) (“While a layperson has the right to represent themselves, a layperson does not have the right to represent others.”). 2 Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Lone Star Coll. Sys. v. Immigration Reform Coal. of Tex. (IRCOT), 418 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). We construe motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as pleas ...
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