17-2462 Kasang v. Barr BIA Cheng, IJ A087 593 582 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 30th day of October, two thousand nineteen. PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ TENZING KASANG, AKA TENZIN KELSANG, Petitioner, v. 17-2462 NAC WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Tenzin Kelsang, pro se, St. Louis, MO. FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; Linda Y. Cheng, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Tenzing Kasang, a native of India, seeks review of an April 19, 2017 decision of the BIA affirming an August 3, 2016 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Kasang’s application for asylum. In re Tenzing Kasang, No. A 087 593 582 (B.I.A. Apr. 19, 2017), aff’g No. A 087 593 582 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 3, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Because Kasang is pro se, we construe his submissions as “rais[ing] the 2 strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Because the IJ granted Kasang’s application for withholding of removal as to Nepal, only the agency’s denial of asylum is at issue. As discussed below, we conclude that the agency reasonably concluded that Kasang is a national of India and therefore eligible for asylum only with respect to that country. Kasang waived any claim of asylum as to India, however, by failing to assert it in his brief. Indian Nationality Contrary to the Government’s position, Kasang exhausted his claim of statelessness before the ...
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