NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 6 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-50141 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00843-DMG-1 v. RAUL GUZMAN-IBAREZ, AKA Raul MEMORANDUM* Guzman, AKA Raul Ibarez Guzman, Jr., AKA Raul Ibarez, AKA Raul Guzman Ibarez, Jr., AKA Little Playboy, AKA Manuel Torres, AKA Miguel Duran Torres, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 12, 2019** Pasadena, California Before: BOGGS,*** WARDLAW, and BEA, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. Raul Guzman-Ibarez (“Guzman”), a native and citizen of Mexico, appeals the district court’s judgment reinstating his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We review de novo a collateral attack on a prior deportation order in a prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. United States v. Alvarado-Pineda, 774 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013). We may affirm the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on any basis supported by the record. United States v. Davis, 336 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 1. As Guzman concedes, our recent decision in United States v. Martinez- Hernandez, 932 F.3d 1198, 1205–07 (9th Cir. 2019), forecloses his argument that his robbery conviction under California Penal Code section 211 does not qualify as an aggravated felony. Accordingly, any error in the district court’s failure to consider this issue was harmless. 2. Guzman next argues that the district court erred in concluding that he was not prejudiced by the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) failure to advise him of the potential availability of discretionary relief under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c)). To establish prejudice, Guzman must demonstrate that he had “plausible grounds” for discretionary relief from removal. United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 1999). Under procedures in effect at the time of Guzman’s removal proceedings, an 2 IJ determined whether to provide relief under § 212(c) by balancing positive and negative factors. Yepes-Prado v. INS, 10 F.3d 1363, 1365–66 (9th Cir. 1993). Positive factors included: “1) family ties within the United States; 2) residence of long duration in this country (particularly when residence began at a young age); 3) hardship to the petitioner or petitioner’s family if relief [was] not granted; 4) service in the United States armed forces; 5) a history of employment; 6) the existence of business or property ties; 7) evidence of value and service to the community; 8) proof of ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals