NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LILIANA ACOSTA CERVANTES; JOSE No. 16-71376 ISAAC DE LA CRUZ ACOSTA; and DARIANA DE LA CRUZ ACOSTA, Agency Nos. A202-097-671 A202-097-672 Petitioners, A202-097-673 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 15, 2019 Pasadena, California Before: M. SMITH, MILLER, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges. Liliana Acosta Cervantes (“Acosta”) and her son Jose Isaac De La Cruz Acosta (“De La Cruz”), who are natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal of the denial of their claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. the Convention Against Torture.1 We have jurisdiction under section 242(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Under the substantial evidence standard, the “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1059. We deny Acosta’s petition for review but grant in part De La Cruz’s petition for review. 1. To establish her eligibility for either asylum or withholding of removal in the context of this case, Acosta had to show, inter alia, (1) that she was a member of the “particular social group” that is the basis of her claim of persecution, see Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010), and (2) that “‘the persecution was committed by the government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control,’” Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010)). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusions that Acosta failed to establish either element. 1 Acosta’s other child, Dariana De La Cruz Acosta, is (like her brother) a derivative beneficiary of Acosta’s application, but (unlike her brother) she has not also filed an independent application for relief. 2 a. Assuming without deciding that Acosta’s proposed social group of “married women in Mexico who are unable to leave their relationship” is cognizable under the INA,2 we conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Acosta failed to establish that she is a member of that social group. As the BIA noted, the factual record confirmed that Acosta had not shown an inability to leave her relationship. Acosta was able to live apart from her husband, José De La Cruz Martínez (“José Sr.”), for more than a year when she moved from Michoacán to Tijuana in July 2013. Although José Sr. verbally threatened ...
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