FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CECILIA AGUILAR FERMIN; ENEDINO No. 18-70855 MATEO DIAZ AGUILAR, Petitioners, Agency Nos. A208-604-206 v. A208-604-207 WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. CECILIA AGUILAR FERMIN, No. 18-73266 Petitioner, Agency No. v. A208-604-206 WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, OPINION Respondent. 2 AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted February 13, 2020* Pasadena, California Filed May 5, 2020 Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Jay S. Bybee, and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Bybee SUMMARY** Immigration Denying Cecilia Aguilar Fermin’s petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum and related relief, as well as the denial of her motion to reopen seeking termination of proceedings in light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the denial of relief, and held that a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) lacking the time, date, and location of a petitioner’s initial removal hearing does not deprive the agency of jurisdiction over removal proceedings. * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 3 The panel concluded that the evidence did not compel the conclusion that Aguilar was credible, for purposes of asylum and withholding relief, due to inconsistencies and implausibilities in the record. The panel also concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that Aguilar could relocate in Mexico to avoid future torture. The panel also concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Aguilar’s motion to reopen for termination of proceedings, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira. Fermin contended that the Supreme Court in Pereira redefined the requirements for a valid NTA and rendered hers insufficient to vest the immigration court with jurisdiction because it lacked the time, date, and location of her hearing. The panel rejected Fermin’s contention, noting that Pereira addressed the requirements for an NTA in regards to the stop-time rule under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A), and not the requirements for an NTA to vest an immigration court with jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14. The panel observed that in Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2019), this court held that Pereira simply has no application in challenges to immigration-court jurisdiction because such jurisdiction is defined by regulation, whereas Pereira interpreted a provision of the INA. The panel further observed that Karingithi concluded that an NTA need not include time and date information to satisfy the regulations, because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b) does not require that the time and date of proceedings appear in the initial notice, and 8 C.F.R. §1003.18(b) compels inclusion of such information only where practicable. The panel noted that the only difference between Karingithi and ...
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