NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 8 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CARLOS R. CARIAS, No. 17-70695 Petitioner, Agency No. A071-592-093 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted June 4, 2020** Pasadena, California Before: OWENS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,*** District Judge. Carlos Carias petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial of his application for suspension of * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation. deportation. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Gomez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 882, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2005). We review questions of law de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. Cui v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289, 1290 (9th Cir. 2008). An alien’s statutory ineligibility for suspension of deportation based on a lack of good moral character is a question of fact. Ramos v. INS, 246 F.3d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). Because we find substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision, we deny Carias’s petition. The BIA determined that Carias could not show that he was a person of good moral character, as required to obtain suspension of deportation, because Carias gave “false testimony for the purpose of obtaining [an immigration] benefit[].” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6); see also 8 U.S.C § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed). Specifically, the BIA upheld the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) determination that, at a March 2015 hearing, Carias falsely testified that a signature on his asylum application was not his and that he did so to obtain an immigration benefit. Substantial evidence supports the finding of false testimony. At a 2015 hearing, Carias unambiguously testified that the signature on his asylum application was not his. Yet, this contradicted his equally unambiguous testimony from a 2012 hearing that the same signature was his. Nor did he offer an adequate explanation for the discrepancies in his testimony. Moreover, in a prior motion before the IJ, Carias admitted, through his counsel, that he reviewed a copy of his asylum 2 application and the signature on it was his. Finally, as the IJ who observed his demeanor found, Carias was evasive during his 2015 testimony. See Paredes- Urrestarazu v. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 817 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that we afford substantial deference to findings based on an adverse credibility determination). Likewise, substantial evidence supports the finding that this false testimony was for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. “Whether a person has the subjective intent to deceive in order to obtain immigration benefits is a question of fact.” United States v. Hovsepian, 422 F.3d 883, 887–88 (9th Cir. ...
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