19-2744 Flores Diaz v. Barr UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the 22nd day of October, two thousand twenty. Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________________________ RICARDO FLORES DIAZ, AKA RICARDO-FLORES, Petitioner, v. 19-2744 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________________________ Appearing for Petitioner: Bruno Joseph Bembi, , Hempstead, N.Y. Appearing for Respondent: Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel (Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of Justice Gregory A. Pennington, Jr., Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, on the brief) Washington, D.C. Petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals. ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DISMISSED. Ricardo Flores Diaz, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of an August 9, 2019, decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), affirming a December 21, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for cancellation of removal. In re Ricardo Flores Diaz, No. A094 235 089 (B.I.A. Aug. 9, 2019), aff’g No. A094 235 089 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Dec. 21, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, that is, without considering the IJ’s finding that Flores Diaz failed to establish the requisite physical presence for cancellation of removal. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). A noncitizen, like Flores Diaz, who entered the United States without inspection, may have his removal cancelled if he “(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been convicted of [certain] offense[s] . . . ; and (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Our jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of cancellation of removal based on an applicant’s failure to ...
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