FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 21 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT HILDA MENDOZA-GOMEZ, No. 19-70745 Petitioner, Agency No. A205-667-407 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 9, 2020** Seattle, Washington Before: GRABER and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KOBAYASHI,*** District Judge. Petitioner Hilda Mendoza Gomez (“Petitioner”) is a native and citizen of Guatemala. She seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. order dismissing her appeal from the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her request for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition. 1. Petitioner argues that the IJ failed to follow the “one central reason” test for asylum and failed to recognize that there may be more than one “central reason” for persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (stating the asylum applicant must establish that a protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant”). On appeal, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Petitioner did not suffer persecution on account of a protected ground. The BIA concluded that the central reason for Petitioner’s persecution was her interference with gang recruitment. Substantial evidence supports the finding that Petitioner was attacked not because of her religion, but because her religious activities discouraged youths from joining the gang. 2. During the proceedings before the IJ, Petitioner did not delineate a particular social group. The IJ did not seek clarification and the BIA did not remand for such clarification. The BIA did, however, determine that the IJ’s nexus determination was not based on any clearly erroneous factual finding or legal error. Petitioner argues that the BIA’s decision not to remand constitutes error. We disagree. Where the BIA conducts a de novo review and applies the correct legal 2 standard, any error by the IJ is rendered harmless. Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus, even if the IJ erred by failing to clarify Petitioner’s social group, the BIA’s review and application of the correct legal standard rendered the error harmless. 3. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv), “the Board will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding appeals.” Petitioner argues that the BIA improperly made factual findings about whether the government of Guatemala acquiesced in her torture. Petitioner seeks remand to the IJ for consideration of that issue. “Where the IJ has not made a finding of fact on a disputed matter, and such a finding is necessary to resolution of the case, ...
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