NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 12 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SORAIDA ISABEL MATEO ALONZO, No. 18-70071 Petitioner, Agency No. A208-304-646 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 9, 2020 Pasadena, California Before: M. SMITH and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,** District Judge. Petitioner Soraida Isabel Mateo Alonzo, an indigenous woman and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of an order entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation. and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We affirm. When the BIA “issues its own decision but relies in part on the [IJ’s] reasoning, we review both decisions.” Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2012)). “We review the denial of asylum, withholding of removal and CAT claims for substantial evidence.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). This means we “must uphold the agency’s determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id. 1. The BIA and IJ correctly concluded that Alonzo was not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that there was no “causal connection” between her alleged harm and protected class. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 2009). The evidence does not compel the conclusion that Alonzo’s status as an indigenous Mayan woman was “a reason,” let alone “one central reason,” for her persecution. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358–60 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that a petitioner’s protected status must be “a reason” for her alleged harm under the withholding-of-removal standard, and “one central reason” under the asylum standard). Notably, Alonzo’s attacker, Garcia, was also indigenous, as were all the other residents of her town, and there was no evidence that Garcia ever referenced 2 her indigenous status or held any animus towards indigenous women generally. See Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 826–27 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding no causal nexus even where the petitioner’s assailants alluded to his protected status while attacking him). Alonzo also testified that she did not know why Garcia targeted her. Substantial evidence thus supported the agency’s determination that Garcia’s motivations were purely personal and sexual in nature. The agency also properly allocated to Alonzo the burden of demonstrating that she could not reasonably avoid persecution by relocating within Guatemala. See Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 2011). An applicant who fails ...
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