NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 23 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT YUNIOR LEONARDO SANTANA- No. 18-70135 GONZALEZ, Agency No. A205-724-820 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 14, 2020 San Francisco, California Before: FERNANDEZ, WARDLAW, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges. Concurrence by Judge COLLINS Yunior Leonardo Santana-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Cuba and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying his claim for relief from removal. He also contends that the Immigration Court lacked jurisdiction over his removal * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Panel proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant in part and remand in part. 1. The Immigration Judge properly exercised jurisdiction over Santana- Gonzalez’s removal proceedings. Although Santana-Gonzalez received a Notice to Appear that did not include the date and time of his hearing, “[a] notice to appear need not include time and date information” for jurisdiction to vest in the Immigration Court, and Santana-Gonzalez had “actual notice of the hearings through multiple follow-up notices that provided the date and time of each hearing.” Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2019). 2. As the government concedes, the BIA erred in concluding that Santana-Gonzalez’s “conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 [was] sufficient, without more, to establish removability under [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i)].” Alien smuggling under § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i) ends when “the initial transporter ceases to transport the alien.” Urzua Covarrubias v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2007). The factual basis of Santana-Gonzalez’s conviction was in a plea agreement in which he admitted to transporting illegal aliens “at or near Bisbee, in the District of Arizona” to “aid[] and abet[] their presence in the United States” after they had already entered the United States. In light of Covarrubias, this conviction, without more, does not establish removability. Because the BIA had an opportunity to consider the application of Panel 2 Covarrubias to this case, we grant the petition in part based on this error. See Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007). 3. “If we conclude that the BIA’s decision cannot be sustained upon its reasoning, we must remand to allow the agency to decide any issues remaining in the case.” Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). The agency did not decide whether Santana-Gonzalez is removable under § 1227(a)(1)(E)(i) considering the evidence of the conduct underlying his conviction, rather than the conviction itself. See Matter of Martinez-Serrano, 25 I. & N. Dec. 151, 153 (BIA 2009) (“[T]he removal ground with which the respondent is charged requires no conviction.”). An individual is removable if he “knowingly encourage[d], induce[d], assist[ed], ...
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