NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 27 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS PIN SIN DONG, No. 18-72082 Petitioner, Agency No. A097-340-190 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 16, 2020** Pasadena, California Before: RAWLINSON and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges, and ENGLAND,*** District Judge. Petitioner Pin Sin Dong (Dong), a citizen of China, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal of * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation. the denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Dong failed to establish that her suffering rises to the level of past persecution. See Al Ramahi v. Holder, 725 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying the substantial evidence standard). “Persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As the BIA pointed out, Dong’s persecution claim is based on a single incident “in 2003 [when] police in China arrested and interrogated her, shouted at her, beat her, pulled her hair, and detained her for about 48 hours after she rented space in her warehouse to members of Falun Gong for their practice.” This single incident was not sufficiently extreme to constitute persecution. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a brief detention, beating, and interrogation did not rise to the level of persecution); see also Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a beating while jailed for a brief interrogation did not rise to the level of persecution). 2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that Dong “has not shown that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution in China on account 2 of a protected ground.” See Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029 (“Absent evidence of past persecution, [an applicant] must establish a well-founded fear of future persecution . . .”) (citation omitted). Despite Dong’s claim that authorities “sought her whereabouts” shortly after she fled China, she failed to establish that Chinese authorities are still interested in her over thirteen years after the last inquiry into her whereabouts.1 Dong’s claim is further undermined by the fact that Dong’s husband and daughter remain in China unharmed. See Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 3. Because Dong failed to meet her burden ...
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