NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 5 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ABEL PENA-GONZALEZ, No. 18-72025 Petitioner, Agency No. A205-530-212 v. MEMORANDUM* ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted February 1, 2021** Pasadena, California Before: GOULD, OWENS, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. Abel Pena-Gonzalez (Pena) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying his request for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). petition for review. We review the BIA’s determination of purely legal questions de novo. Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2000). The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Rayamajhi v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2019). Under this deferential standard, factual findings are treated as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Singh v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, in order to reverse the BIA’s finding under substantial evidence review, “we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992). 1. Pena’s withholding of removal claim fails because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Pena was unable to show he would be persecuted because of his membership in a particular social group (PSG). Specifically, Pena contends that he will be persecuted as a member of three proposed PSGs: (1) “members of the Pena family”; (2) “persons oppressed by crime in Mexico”; and (3) “witnesses to crime in Mexico.” With respect to Pena’s first proposed PSG, the BIA concluded that Pena failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the harm suffered by some of his family members and their family membership. See Lkhagvasuren v. Lynch, 849 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The petitioner has the burden to prove that a nexus exists 2 between the persecution and a protected ground.”). The fact that some of Pena’s family members have been harmed is not enough to show a nexus—that is, that they were harmed because they were members of the Pena family—and the record lacks evidence that the threats and harm against such family members were motivated by their kinship.1 See id. at 803 (“Where persecution did not occur on account of a protected ground … claims for … withholding of removal necessarily fail.”). In addition, Pena’s mother, two sisters, one of his brothers, and extended family members continue to live unharmed in Talpa, Mexico, Pena’s hometown. As ...
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