FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RICARDO CHACON, No. 18-71515 Petitioner, Agency No. v. A094-766-759 ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General, OPINION Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 19, 2020 * San Francisco, California Filed February 18, 2021 Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Andrew D. Hurwitz, and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Bress * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2 CHACON V. WILKINSON SUMMARY ** Immigration Denying Ricardo Chacon’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that a conviction for importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms without a license, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), is categorically an “illicit trafficking in firearms” aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C) that made him ineligible for asylum. Because the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) does not define “illicit trafficking,” the panel considered whether to defer to the BIA’s interpretation in its unpublished decision in this case. In a prior published decision in Matter of Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), abrogated on other grounds, the BIA concluded that illicit trafficking in a controlled substance – another aggravated felony – includes any felony conviction involving the “unlawful trading or dealing of any controlled substance.” Relying on Davis, the BIA here concluded that “illicit trafficking in firearms” means “any unlawful trading or dealing” in firearms. The panel deferred to the BIAs’ interpretation, concluding that whether Chevron or some lesser measure of deference applied, the BIA’s interpretation is persuasive. The panel explained that the BIA’s definition tracks the common understanding of “trafficking,” which means some ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. CHACON V. WILKINSON 3 sort of commercial dealing. The panel also explained that the definition is consistent with Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2008), where this court interpreted “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance” and held that a state offense contained a trafficking element because it required intent to engage in commercial dealing. The panel saw no reason to depart from the rule of statutory interpretation that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same meaning, noting that “illicit trafficking in firearms” is in the very next sub- definition of “aggravated felony” after “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” Next, the panel concluded that § 922(a)(1)(A) is a categorical match to “illicit trafficking in firearms” under § 1101(a)(43)(C), explaining that § 922(a)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for any person (except those licensed to do so) “to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce.” Looking to the statute’s extensive definition of what ...
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