NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________ No. 19-3513 ____________ VICTOR HUGO MEJIA-ESPINOZA, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ________________ On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA-1 : A090-695-156) Immigration Judge: David Cheng ________________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 22, 2020 Before: AMBRO, PORTER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed February 17, 2021) ____________ OPINION* ____________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. AMBRO, Circuit Judge Petitioner Victor Hugo Mejia-Espinoza petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). It dismissed his appeal after an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied his claim for relief and ordered his removal. We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. I. Mejia-Espinoza, a citizen of Ecuador, entered the United States without inspection in 2005 or before.1 He married in 2013 and, with his wife, has three minor children who are United States citizens. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) began removal proceedings, serving Mejia-Espinoza with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) that did not specify a hearing date and time. A few weeks later, DHS followed up the NTA with a hearing notice setting the date and time. Mejia-Espinoza conceded removability but sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal. An immigration judge (“IJ”) held a hearing in 2018, at which Mejia-Espinoza alone testified. The IJ then denied cancellation of removal, explaining that Mejia-Espinoza had not demonstrated the ten years of continuous presence in the United States that is statutorily required for relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). While DHS conceded he had been in the United States since 2005, the record was unclear as to how long he had been present before that, and, under the so-called “stop-time rule,” the 1 He claims he first entered the country in 1997, but, as noted below, the immigration judge concluded there was insufficient evidence of his presence before 2005. 2 period terminated in 2010 (hence five years short) with service of the NTA. See id. § 1229b(d)(1). The IJ concluded alternatively that Mejia-Espinoza had not demonstrated a separate statutory requirement for cancellation of removal: that his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his U.S. citizen children. See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). He explained that Mejia-Espinoza’s wife did not provide a letter or testify to corroborate his role in supporting their children, and that the children do not suffer from any medical issues that would cause such an unusual hardship. The IJ also noted he would decline, as a matter of discretion, to grant cancellation of removal because Mejia-Espinoza admitted during the hearing that he left the United States and gained readmittance using someone else’s passport. Mejia-Espinoza appealed to the BIA, arguing, among other things, that (1) the failure of the NTA to specify a hearing date and time deprived the IJ ...
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