Yudith Flores-Rios v. Attorney General United States


NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________ No. 20-2273 _____________ YUDITH ANTONIETA FLORES-RIOS, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _____________ On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A206-247-155 Immigration Judge: Ramin Rastegar _____________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on January 19, 2021 Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges (Filed: March 2, 2021) _______________ OPINION ________________ SMITH, Chief Judge. * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Yudith Flores-Rios petitions for review of a May 27, 2020 Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision adopting and affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. I. Flores-Rios, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without a valid entry document in October 2013 and was served with a notice to appear shortly thereafter. She applied for withholding of removal and CAT protection,1 claiming she was afraid to return to El Salvador because her ex-boyfriend was abusive, and because, when she briefly went into business with her sister selling tortillas from their home, a gang known as the Mara left her a note demanding $35 as “rent” and threatening her if she did not pay. The IJ issued a detailed opinion denying relief. Flores-Rios appealed to the BIA, which affirmed and adopted the IJ’s decision. This timely petition for review followed.2 1 Flores-Rios also applied for asylum but did not seek review of the IJ’s determination that she was statutorily ineligible because she applied outside the one-year deadline. 2 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision and discussed some of the bases for the IJ’s decision, we review both decisions. See He Chun Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). 2 II. In support of her application for withholding of removal, Flores-Rios argued that, if she returns to El Salvador, she more likely than not will be persecuted on account of her membership in a particular social group (PSG). See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 180 (3d Cir. 2003); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). She claimed to be a member of two PSGs: (1) Salvadoran “abused women who do not have any protection by the government authority against the domestic violence,” and (2) “business owners targeted by gangs.” Pet’r Br. 7. The existence of a PSG is a question of law we consider de novo, while we review the agency’s underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2018). As to the first PSG, the IJ concluded that, even if it is cognizable, Flores- Rios failed to establish her membership in that group because she “did not establish that she . …

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