NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________ No. 20-2710 ________________ KEVIN DANIEL SAUCEDA BEJARNO, Appellant v. ANDREA DAYANA MONTOYA JIMENEZ ________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 2-19-cv-17524) Honorable John M. Vazquez, U.S. District Judge ________________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) On March 1, 2021 Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: March 2, 2021) ________________ OPINION* ________________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. Kevin Daniel Sauceda Bejarno appeals from the District Court’s denial of his petition to return his son, L.S., to Honduras under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 22514 U.N.T.S. 98, and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001, et seq. For the following reasons, we will affirm. I. Discussion Although Appellant established a prima facie case that Appellee, L.S.’s mother, had wrongfully removed L.S. from Honduras to the United States, the District Court denied the return request because a petition filed more than one year after removal “is subject to certain affirmative defenses, including Appellee’s demonstration [by a preponderance of the evidence] that ‘the child is now settled in its new environment.’” Monzon v. De La Roca, 910 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hague Convention at art. 12). The District Court determined that Appellee met this burden, and we review its factual findings for clear error and any conclusions of law de novo. See Yang v. Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2007). In a careful and thorough analysis of the ten factors we specified in Monzon, 1 the District Court determined that only two weighed against L.S. being well-settled in his New 1 These factors are: “(1) the age of the child; (2) the stability of the child’s new residence; (3) whether the child attends school . . . consistently; (4) whether the child at- tends church regularly [or participates in other extracurricular and community activities]; (5) the stability of the parent’s employment or other means of support; (6) whether the child has friends and relatives in the area; (7) to what extent the child has maintained ties 2 Jersey home and community: “the stability of [Appellee’s] employment or other means of support” and “the immigration status of the child and parent.” A16. As to those factors, the District Court reasoned that L.S. and Appellee are not citizens, so “their immigration status remains uncertain,” A21, while their asylum application is pending, and that without a work permit, Appellee has only “worked sporadically in a restaurant,” A19. Nonetheless, it concluded that these considerations were greatly outweighed by the remaining considerations, including L.S.’s “stable” family life with his stepfather and half-brother, with whom he has “grown very close,” A18; his involvement in school, extracurricular activities, and community activities, see A18–19; and his memories of …
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